ABSTRACT: In this paper, I'll look at the implications of Richard Foley's epistemology for two different kinds of religious disagreement. First, there are those occasions on which a stranger testifies to me that she holds disagreeing religious beliefs. Typically,
In Part I of his 2001 book, Foley provides an interesting and thoughtful summary of historical attempts to refute skepticism. He worries that the only way in which we could completely refute skepticism is by embracing an epistemology on which "the conditions of rational belief are conditions to which we always have immediate and unproblematic access." 1 He calls this epistemology of direct acquaintance "Russellian Foundationalism," after you-know-who. Unfortunately, he says, few epistemologists are willing to take that kind of "extreme" epistemology seriously anymore, 2 presumably because of the "withering attacks" of the last half-century, 3 and because, as Foley says, "there is no way of providing non-question-begging assurances of the reliability of one's faculties and beliefs." 4 So, he concludes:
Once we give up on [Russellian Foundationalism], we have no choice but to acknowledge that significant intellectual projects require correspondingly significant leaps of intellectual faith. 5 And so direct acquaintance takes a back seat to self-trust for the rest of Foley's book. Giving up on an epistemology of direct acquaintance is, I think, a bit hasty, and in the final section of this paper I'll try to sell you on a more moderate cousin of Russellian Foundationalism. For now, let's focus on self-trust, which, according to Foley, explains why we generally trust the testimony of others:
The presumption of trust in others is generated out of self-trust. My opinions have been shaped by faculties and circumstances that shape the opinions of others. Thus, insofar as I trust my opinions and faculties, I am pressured to trust the opinions and faculties of others as well, even when I know little or nothing about their track records of reliability or their specific circumstances or backgrounds. 6 Naturally, this presumptive trust may be defeated by information indicating I'm an epistemic superior. And that's not all, Foley continues:
In addition, there is an important and common way in which the prima facie credibility of someone else's opinion can be defeated even when I have no specific knowledge of the individual's track record, capacities, training, evidence, or background. It is defeated when our opinions conflict, because, by my lights, the person has been unreliable. Whatever credibility would have attached to the person's opinion as a result of my general attitude of trust toward the opinions of others is defeated by the trust I have in myself. …[W]hen my opinions conflict with a person about whom I know little, the pressure to trust that person is dissipated because, with respect to the issue in question, the conflict itself constitutes a relevant dissimilarity between us. 7
Let's say a stranger is, in my case, someone about whose track record, capacities, training, prior evidence, and background I have little or no specific knowledge. In the absence of such knowledge, Foley says, my prima facie reason to accept another person's testimony "is defeated if I have a conflicting opinion," and yet, "it nonetheless may still be epistemically rational for me to defer to the person, but only if I have special reasons indicating that he or she is better positioned than I to assess the claim in question. So, in sum, Foley thinks the following is true:
If I know that a stranger and I have conflicting degrees of belief in p, and I don't have special reasons to think that she's in a better position than I am to assess p, then (ceteris paribus) I have no reason to move my opinion in the direction of her opinion. 10 If STRANGER CLAIM were true, it would excuse those who, like me, politely but firmly shut the door on those pesky proselytizers on the porch. Foley's STRANGER CLAIM would license that dismissive behavior since, by our lights, these strangers have proven themselves unreliable simply by disagreeing with us. This is a relevant dissimilarity, Foley says, and entails that we have no reason to move our opinions in the direction of those strangers' opinions.
understands epistemic rationality as invulnerability to self-criticism. More carefully: Smith's belief B is rational just in case B is in accord with Smith's other reflective first-order opinions, as well as with her reflective second-order opinions about the ways she can reliably acquire opinions (Intellectual Trust, 28) . But there are very many epistemically disordered (i.e. crazy) people out there, including unreflective people who only gently self-criticize as well as hyperreflective people who harshly self-criticize. And so it may easily come out as Foley-rational for some hyper-self-critical Smith to defer to a disagreeing stranger even when Smith lacks special reasons indicating that the stranger is better positioned to assess the claim in questionsteadfastness may not hold up to Smith's inordinately severe self-criticism. And so it looks like Foley's general principle here is inconsistent with his favored account of rationality. I believe this is also true of his other general principles discussed below, but I won't mention it again.
Counterexample
Unfortunately, STRANGER CLAIM is false, and we can't excuse our dismissive behavior so easily. Here's an example to help us see why. Suppose I know that, on average, adult humans are 85% accurate when it comes to distinguishing maple trees from non-maple trees. I've tested myself on the question, and I'm perfectly average: 85% accurate. One day I'm staring at what I'm certain is a maple, and an adult human stranger approaches. "What a fine lookin' non-maple tree," she says. Would it really be rational for me to end up with the same degree of confidence that I started with? Foley says "Yes," but intuition shouts "No!") But then STRANGER CLAIM gives the wrong verdict here, and so it isn't true. So, we'll have to look for some other explanation of why it is excusable to dismiss the opinions of disagreeing strangers.
reasonable for me to regard us as exact epistemic peers with respect to the issue, it is reasonable for me to withhold judgment until I better understand how one or both of us have gone wrong." So perhaps Foley's view on peer disagreement entails that I should be conciliatory in the maple tree case, even though his view on stranger disagreement clearly entails that I shouldn't. If so, Foley's combined view is incoherent.
respect to some subset of religious questions. 13 If my reliability were just average, I should be much more deferential towards disagreeing strangers, as the maple tree example illustrates. And when I was younger, I often took the religious disagreement of strangers very seriously, since I estimated myself to be at best average with respect to assessing those religious issues. And if, for example, a stranger at a distinguished philosophy of religion conference disagreed with me about religious issues, I would take that very seriously, since I'd have antecedent reasons to believe that she's better than average at assessing very many religious questions.
So it's not, as Foley says, that the stranger's prima facie credibility is defeated because, by my lights, she's proven unreliable. Rather, in at least some disagreements the stranger remains credible, depending on how reliable I antecedently believe she is compared to me. A stranger's disagreement may, therefore, provide me with some reason to significantly change my degree of belief. But then Foley's STRANGER CLAIM just isn't right.
Peer Disagreement Now I'll lay out Foley's views on disagreement between epistemic peers. Then, I'll offer some objections to his position, and express worries that his view doesn't have the resources to answer these objections.
Foley says this about peer disagreement:
[S]uppose it is rational for me to believe that we are equally well positioned to evaluate the issue and equally skilled and equally well informed and that we have also devoted an equal amount of time and effort to thinking about the issue. …I have no reason to simply defer to your authority. On the other hand, neither is it permissible for me simply to go on believing what I had been believing. Insofar as it is reasonable for me to regard us as exact epistemic peers with respect to the issue, it is reasonable for me to withhold judgment until I better understand how one or both of us have gone wrong. 14 In the context, it is clear that Foley is working with an all-or-nothing model of belief here. And so, the last sentence in the above quotation seems to be a rough statement of an equal-weight view of peer disagreement: 13 I think Foley himself might agree here, since he says (Intellectual Trust, 119): "experts are unlikely to have reasons to think that others are in a better position than they to evaluate issues within their specialty." I'd add that experts are also unlikely to have reasons to think that others are in an equal position. 14 Foley, Intellectual Trust, 110-111.
FOLEY'S EQUAL-WEIGHT VIEW:
If I reasonably believe we disagree about p, and that we're equally well positioned, well informed, skilled, and diligent with respect to p, then it's reasonable for me to give your opinion on p equal weight as my own.
If, as Foley says, in such a case my opinion is p and yours is not-p, then it's reasonable to withhold judgment on p. I think that the equal-weight view has much intuitive appeal, and that it delivers the right verdict in a wide variety of cases. So enamored am I by the equal-weight view that I've even defended a version of it in print, against apparent counterexamples and against the charge of self-defeat. 15 However, my defense relied on an epistemology of direct acquaintance, something in the neighborhood of Russellian Foundationalism. I worry that, since Foley has given up on Russellian Foundationalism and instead embraced an epistemology of self-trust, he lacks the resources to prevent his equal-weight view of peer disagreement from issuing absurd verdicts, defeating itself, and requiring an unappealing degree of spinelessness, which would extend to our most deeply held religious beliefs. (Serious charges indeed!)
Let me first explain the problematic cases I have in mind. Consider Extreme Restaurant Check: You and your friend go out to dinner, and it's time to split the check. You both know the value of the bill, and you reasonably believe that, here in the circumstances, you're peers when it comes to this sort of arithmetic. The bill total is only $75, but, after careful and sober calculation, your friend sincerely declares that each share is $450, a far sight over the whole tab. Intuitively, it's not reasonable to give her assessment equal weight in this apparent case of peer disagreement. But that's contrary to what the equal-weight view -Foley's version in particular -seems to recommend. So here we have an apparent counterexample. Now consider Extreme Skepticism: You're at the restaurant again, and you reasonably believe your friend to be a peer on questions about what happened within the last hour in this restaurant. But then the bill arrives, and your friend sincerely, soberly, and triumphantly announces that you need not pay the bill, since the world popped into existence a mere five minutes ago with the appearance of age, including this bill and the food in your stomachs. Intuitively, it's not reasonable to give her assessment equal weight in this apparent case of peer disagreement. But that's contrary to what the equal-weight view -Foley's version in particular -seems to recommend. So here too we have an apparent counterexample.
Finally, consider the charge of Self-Defeat: Critics of the equal-weight view point out that its advocates know of epistemic peers who disagree strongly enough for the equal-weight view to recommend giving itself up. And so, the critic concludes, if the equal-weight view is true, we shouldn't believe it. And of course if it's false we shouldn't believe it either.
A moderate version of Russellian Foundationalism supplies satisfying responses to the above cases. We need not subscribe to Foley's extreme construal of Russellian Foundationalism, namely that we always have immediate and unproblematic access to the conditions of rational belief. As long as we occasionally have this access, the problems of the previous paragraphs may be avoided. Let me explain.
When you take your faculties to be as reliable as your friend's, and each of your faculties are given the same inputs, it is clearly unacceptably arbitrary to dismiss the report that p from your friend's faculties on the basis of the report that not-p from your own faculties. But if you're relying not on a report from your faculties, but rather on your immediate and unproblematic access to the fact that not-p, steadfastness is clearly called for. And this is just what happens in Extreme Restaurant Check. On that occasion, you have -via what some philosophers have called "rational intuition" -immediate and unproblematic access to the fact that each share of this check is not $450. Or so I claim. 16 This reasoning can be extended to the problem of Self-Defeat. In the last paragraph, we learned how steadfastness may be called for in cases involving knowledge from that unmediated access to the truth of propositions sometimes afforded by rational intuition. And it's plausible that the equal-weight view is itself a deliverance of rational intuition. Even Thomas Kelly, a prominent opponent of the equal-weight view, admits that "reflection on certain kinds of disagreement in Extreme Restaurant Check in terms of my friend's error, if all that I have access to are the report of my faculties and the report of my friend's faculties, both of which, by hypothesis, I trust equally? If Russell's direct acquaintance is off the table, how will my preference for the report of my faculties fail to be unacceptably arbitrary, how will it fail to be the unpalatable I'm me, so I win! response to peer disagreement?
It seems to me that, if direct acquaintance is off the table, we'll be in the position of a man with disagreeing reports from two thermometers that he takes to be equally reliable. Since conciliation is called for in the thermometer case, I think Foley is committed to saying that conciliation is also called for in Extreme Restaurant Check and Extreme Skepticism. And this would extend to our most deeply held religious beliefs as well. But that's the unhappy "spineless" result we'd like to avoid. For similar reasons, I don't see how Foley can avoid the charge of self-defeat.
This isn't a knock down argument against Foley's epistemology -I'm failing to see how it might survive rather than successfully seeing that it can't. Rather, this is an invitation for Foley to say more about how his epistemology eludes those absurd, spineless, and self-defeating results.
I think these considerations give us a strong reason to take another look at an epistemology that countenances direct acquaintance. Such an epistemology can endorse the intuitively attractive equal-weight view, while at the same time accommodating our intuitions in Extreme Restaurant Check, Extreme Skepticism, and Self-Defeat.
And those explanations I've given have interesting and far-reaching consequences for religious disagreement. A few of our religious disagreements will be similar to Extreme Restaurant Check: cases in which we can just see the falsity of our friend's answer. 21 A few more of our religious disagreements will be similar to Extreme Skepticism: cases in which our friend's answer is a clear sign of cognitive malfunction. 22 The equal-weight view will not commit us to conciliation in any such cases, for reasons given above. And of course a vast swath of our religious disagreements will not be with epistemic peers at all, since it's very rare indeed to perfectly share the relevant evidence, talent, diligence, etc. with another person. And then there are the "close questions," as jurists say, between bona fide epistemic peers. Such cases, though not impossible, will be extremely rare. And so the religious disagreement we actually find around us will be significantly less concerning to an epistemology that countenances direct acquaintance, e.g. mine. 23
